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Chapter 9
COVID-19 and Optimal Lockdown
Strategies: The Effect of New and More
Virulent Strains
Jonathan P. Caulkins, Dieter Grass, Gustav Feichtinger, Richard F. Hartl,
Peter M. Kort, Alexia Prskawetz, Andrea Seidl, and Stefan Wrzaczek
Abstract Most nations have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by locking
down parts of their economies starting in early 2020 to reduce the infectious spread.
The optimal timing of the beginning and end of the lockdown, together with its
intensity, is determined by the tradeoff between economic losses and improved health
outcomes. These choices can bemodelledwithin the framework of an optimal control
model that recognises the nonlinear dynamics of epidemic spread and the increased
risks when infection rates surge beyond the healthcare system’s capacity. Past work
has shown that within such a framework very different strategies may be optimal
J. P. Caulkins (B)
Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, 4800 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
e-mail: caulkins@andrew.cmu.edu
D. Grass · S. Wrzaczek





G. Feichtinger · A. Prskawetz
Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Methods in Economics, TU Wien, Wiedner Hauptstr.




R. F. Hartl · A. Seidl
Department of Business Decisions and Analytics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz





Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB
Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: Kort@uvt.nl
© The Author(s) 2022
M. C. Boado-Penas et al. (eds.), Pandemics: Insurance and Social Protection,
Springer Actuarial, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78334-1_9
163
164 J. P. Caulkins et al.
ranging from short to long and even multiple lockdowns, and small changes in the
valuation on preventing a premature death may lead to quite different strategies
becoming optimal. There even exist parameter constellations for which two or more
very different strategies can be optimal. Here we revisit those crucial questions with
revised parameters reflecting the greater infectivity of variants such as the “UK
variant” of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and describe how the new variant may affect
levels of mortality and other outcomes.
9.1 Introduction
To reduce social interactions and thereby also contagious transmission of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus, most countries have implemented one or several lockdowns of non-
essential parts of the economy. While lockdowns have succeeded to varying degrees
in reducing new infections, the effects on the economy (Fernández-Villaverde and
Jones 2020) can be substantial. The lockdowns can themselves harm health, either
directly (e.g.,whennon-essential healthcare is deferred) or indirectly (unemployment
and poverty can reduce life expectancy). The question therefore arises as to what is
the ideal duration and intensity of lockdowns. If lockdowns are relaxed too soon, the
epidemic may bounce back. If these measures are too severe or prolonged, needless
economic hardship may result.
9.1.1 The Challenge of New Virus Variants
Such questions have become even more pressing with the discovery of new, mutated
strains of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, notably one detected first in the UK and thus
referred to as “UK variant”. This strain appears to bemuchmore virulent, in the sense
of spreading more rapidly. In particular, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
had previously advised that epidemiological models use as a base case assumption
that the basic reproduction number (denoted by R0) of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was
2.5, but the new variant is thought to be about 60% more contagious, suggesting a
new R0 of 4.0.
The new variant is not more lethal, so far as is understood at at the time of this
writing; i.e., its infection fatality rate is not higher. So the consequences of COVID-
19 spreading through the majority of the population are roughly the same, apart
from greater mortality when cases are bunched up in time, swamping the healthcare
system, but the severity of lockdown necessary to prevent such spread is greater and
so more costly. In particular, lockdowns and other interventions that reduced social
interaction by 60%would have been sufficient to stall the spread of the original virus,
since 2.5 × (1 − 60%) = 1.0, butwith the newvirus, those same interventionswould
have each infection leading to 4.0 × (1 − 60%) = 1.6 new infections.
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Since the course of the typical infection plays out over roughly two weeks, that
would leave the number of new infections growing at a compound rate of about
1.62 − 1 = 150% per month. If it will take another six to nine months to achieve
herd immunity through mass vaccinations, that spread would be fast enough to infect
essentially everyone in a country that currently has an average rate of infections.
Hence, policies that were adequate or even optimal in the past may no longer be so
today.
This paper explores how this greater virulence may or may not alter conclusions
about what constitutes the ideal timing and duration of a lockdown. It also adjusts the
time horizon until an effective vaccine has been widely deployed to T = 1.5 years,
better reflecting the actual trajectory of vaccine development that has been observed.
9.1.2 Review of Past Findings
We begin here with a brief review of findings obtained from these lockdown models
using the older, lower basic reproduction number of R0 = 2.5. In Caulkins et al.
(2020)we analysed an epidemiologicalmodel of the pandemic overlainwith a simple
optimal control model that considers the optimal starting and ending times of a
lockdown that withdraws part of the population from the labour force. The objective
function balances economic costs (lost output) and health costs (COVID-19 related
deaths) while considering the limited capacity of intensive care units within the
health care system. The number of deaths is modelled as being proportional to the
number of infections plus an extra penalty for infections that happen when hospitals
are overwhelmed.
Even that rather simple model produces some complex behaviour. For instance,
sometimes starting a lockdown later might make it better to have a shorter, not a
longer lockdown. Most interestingly, we found the formal mathematical version of
the notion of “tipping points” that were popularised by Malcolm Gladwell’s famous
book of that name. In particular, for certain parameter values two very different
strategies (e.g., long versus short lockdown) can be optimal when starting at the
same initial condition, and slight deviations away from those starting points may
make either type of solution optimal. In optimal control models, such tipping points
with two or more alternative optimal solution trajectories have been called Skiba,
Sethi-Skiba, DNS, and DNSS points (Grass et al. 2008).
Characterising such points is important for two reasons. First, it may help explain
why different countries have pursued such different lockdown strategies despite hav-
ing similar interests in balancing economic andhealth considerations. Secondly, these
tipping points highlight the need to gather better information about the key parame-
ters that cause these different lockdown strategies to be optimal.
Caulkins et al. (2021) extended Caulkins et al. (2020) by allowing for multiple
lockdowns and also considering lockdowns of varying intensity, rather than treating
a lockdown as an all or nothing binary choice. In addition, the economic modelling
is richer in two respects. First, employment is represented by a state variable, and the
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policy maker’s choices, or “control variable”, adjusts that level of economic activity.
Underemployment is costly of course (foregone economic activity), but so too is
changes in that level; rapidly alternating between mild and severe lockdowns is more
costly than maintaining an intermediate lockdown because change is disruptive to
business. Furthermore, the adjustment costs are asymmetric to recognise that shutting
down businesses may be easier than re-starting them.
Second, since the public’s cooperation canwanewhen lockdowns are too intensive
and long, Caulkins et al. (2021) include “lockdown fatigue” as an additional state
variable which may undermine the efficiency of a lockdown.
Within this framework, the optimal lockdown strategies are quite diverse, rang-
ing from long and forceful lockdowns to (a couple of) short and rather soft lock-
downs. Again, the specific parameter values determine the optimal strategy. Similar
to Caulkins et al. (2020), there are parameter constellations for which two very dif-
ferent strategies are both optimal. In addition, we also found triple Skiba points at
which even three different strategies are optimal. The fact that such complex strate-
gies result from rather stylisedmodels hints at the complexity of designing lockdown
strategies in practice. While our models cannot specify/recommend any single opti-
mal lockdown strategy, our framework provides insight as to which are the most
important parameters that drive the decision about the start, duration and intensity
as well as the multiplicity of lockdowns.
Before investigating how the UK variant might affect these models and selected
results we give a brief summary of related papers in the literature.
9.1.3 Review of Other Related Literature
Several papers discuss the balancing of health and economic interests (see Layard
et al. 2020; Bloom et al. 2020; Scherbina 2020; Brodeur et al. 2020 for a careful
evaluation). However only a minority of these papers have investigated the opti-
mal timing, length and extent of the lockdown itself. These exceptions include e.g.
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2020) who start from a simple SIR model and inves-
tigate the optimal lockdown intensity and duration taking into account the tradeoff
between health and economic consequences of the lockdown.
In Alvarez et al. (2020) the fraction of people going into lockdown is assumed to
be the control variable. The model is derived with and without testing as a control
variable where test availability implies that those who are recovered can be identified
and are not subject to lockdown. It is shown that absence of testing will increase the
economic costs of the lockdown and shorten its duration since the dynamics of the
epidemiology imply that an increasing share of recovered will decrease the efficiency
of the lockdown.
An optimal control model on reducing the transmission rate is presented in Abel
and Panageas (2020) that also allows for positive vital rates (births and non-COVID
deaths). They show that it is not optimal to eradicate the disease but to limit interac-
tions until a cure or vaccination becomes available. In Acemoglu et al. (2020) a het-
9 COVID-19 and Optimal Lockdown Strategies 167
erogeneous SIRmodel is applied that distinguishes between “young”, “middle-aged”
and “old”. It is shown that a stricter lockdown on the old is particularly important.
Compared to optimal uniform policies such targeted policies imply a considerable
reduction in mortality but may also reduce economic damage since the young and
middle-aged groups can be released from lockdown earlier. A similar argument is
presented in Gershon et al. (2020) who show that if ICU beds are in short supply,
partial quarantine of the most vulnerable group may be enough compared to a shut
down of the whole economy. Aspri et al. (2021) consider a SEIRD model, where the
population is divided into susceptibles, exposed but asymptomatic, infected, recov-
ered and deceased. Similar to other papers they model the optimal tradeoff between
reduction in fatalities and the loss in output. However, different to the literature so
far, they assume that containment policies are piece-wise linear functions represent-
ing a more realistic policy modelling. Based on the specific value assumed for a
statistical life they obtain multiple lockdowns as well as Skiba points. While the
previous models apply numerical solution methods, Rachel (2020) presents an ana-
lytical model of COVID-19 lockdowns. By differentiating between the individual
versus social optimal mitigation strategy it is shown that at the individual level too
much social distancing will result in equilibrium relative to the social optimum. This
result is explained by the fact that higher social distancing today will reduce infec-
tions and flatten out the curve, but raise infection rates later on. In contrast, a social
planner considers the cumulative infection risk and not just the infection risk today.
In Huberts and Thijssen (2020) a stochastic version of the SIR model is introduced.
Based on a continuous-time Markov chain model the optimal timing of interven-
tion and the option to end the intervention are studied. Federico and Ferrari (2021)
present a model on the optimal lockdown policy where not only the transmission
rate in the standard SIR model is stochastic, but also the time horizon is assumed
to be stochastic. Within their framework they show that the optimal policy is first
to let the epidemic evolve, followed by a pronounced containment policy and in the
last phase to reduce the strength of the containment again. Similar to our model the
limited capacity of health system is considered in Piguillem and Shi (2020). Testing
is an important strategy to accrue welfare gains in their paper.
The body of this paper now proceeds in two parts. Section9.2 explores a model in
which the policy maker only gets to decide the start and end times of a lockdown, but
the intensity of that lockdown is fixed. Section9.3 then examines the more general
situation when the lockdown intensity can be varied continuously over time, and
there can even be more than one lockdown.
9.2 The Optimal Start and Length of a Lockdown
This section updates the model presented in Caulkins et al. (2020) to address the
higher infectivity of the UK variant of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
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9.2.1 The Model
The epidemiological model we apply is based on an open-population SLIR model
Kermack and McKendrick (1927) with a birth rate ν and extra mortality for individ-
uals who are infected (μI ) above and beyond that for those who are susceptible or
recovered (μ):
Ṡ(t) = νN (t) − β S(t)I(I (t), L(t))
N (t)
− μS(t) (9.1a)
L̇(t) = β S(t)I(I (t), L(t))
N (t)
− (μ + ϕ)L(t) (9.1b)
İ (t) = ωϕL(t) − (α + μ + μI )I (t) (9.1c)
Ṙ(t) = (1 − ω)ϕL(t) + α I (t) − μR(t) (9.1d)
β := Reff(t, τ1, τ2)α (9.1e)
I(I, L) := I + f L (9.1f)
N (t) := S(t) + L(t) + I (t) + R(t). (9.1g)
The state variables S(t), L(t), I (t) and R(t) denote the number of individuals
respectively who are susceptible to infection, have a latent (asymptomatic and pre-
symptomatic) infection, are infected and symptomatic, and are recovered at time t .
The term “recovered” is standard in the literature even though it is a bit of amisnomer
because it includes not only those who have recovered from COVID-19 symptoms
(i.e., passed through the I state), but also those who previously had asymptomatic
infections (passed through the L state only). (CDC guidance is that about 40% of
those who become infected remain asymptomatic.)
The parameterβ is key to the epidemic dynamics. The term itmodifies inEq. (9.1a)
counts potential interactions between those who are susceptible to becoming infected
(those in the S state) and those are infected (those in the L and I states). The symbol
I denotes the weighted sum of people in the I and L states, weighting by the (lower)
relative likelihood of spreading the virus when in the L state. (As of this writing, the
CDC recommends assuming this weighting parameter f = 0.75.) β is essentially
a proportionality constant that converts social interactions into infections. Outside
of the lockdown it has one (higher) value; during the lockdown its value is lower,
e.g., because either the infected or susceptible person wears a mask, maintains social
distance, interacts only virtually if one or both work from home, or the interaction
simply does not occur because it has been banned by the lockdown.
Although lockdowns directly affect β, the effective reproduction number
Reff(t, τ1, τ2) is more readily interpretable, so we describe the lockdown phases in
terms of effects on Reff(t, τ1, τ2) and adjust β accordingly. (For a formal derivation
of the relationship between the basic reproduction number R0 and β, see Appendix 2
in Caulkins et al. (2020)). The start and end times of the lockdown are denoted by τ1
and τ2. They are chosen by the decision maker and—as we only allow one lockdown
in this setup—define three periods: before, during and after that one lockdown.
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Following CDC guidance, Caulkins et al. (2020) assumed that the basic reproduc-
tion number before the lockdown equals R10 = 2.5. The lockdown was assumed to
reduce that to R20 = 0.8 and not bounce back fully, as some behavioural adjustments
(such as not shaking hands) could be expected to continue even after people return
to work. The extent to which those behavioural changes persisted depends on the
duration of the lockdown. In particular, Caulkins et al. (2020) assumed that after the
lockdown there exists a gap between the realised and potential value of R30 = 2.0,
with the potential value being reached only with increasing length of the lockdown.
Here, we assume that the reproduction numbers before and after the lockdown
are 1.6 times larger (so R10 = 4.0 and R30 = 3.2) but continue to assume that during
the lockdown R20 = 0.8. I.e., we implicitly assume that the lockdown intensity is
increased sufficiently to push the reproduction number appreciably below 1.0 despite
the new variant’s greater infectivity.
We model COVID-19 deaths by focusing on those who require hospitalisation
and critical care. Some calculations (described in Caulkins et al. 2020) suggest that
about p = 2.31% of people who develop symptoms will need critical care, and 45%
of them will die prematurely as a result of COVID-19 even if they receive that
care. The parameter p converts the 2.31% into a daily rate by multiplying by α,
the reciprocal of the average duration of symptoms, which we take to be nine days.
Likewise, the death rate per person-day spent in the I state by people who need and
also receive critical care is μI = pξ1α.
In addition, there is an extra risk of death for people who need critical care but
do not receive it because hospitals are overwhelmed. That term is proportional to
max({0, pI − Hmax}) where Hmax is the number of critical care hospital beds avail-
able.1 In the U.S., there are about 0.176 critical care beds per 1,000 people. Overall
deaths are therefore represented by:
ξ1 pI + ξ2 max({0, pI − Hmax}, ζ ),
where ξ1 is the death rate from COVID-19 of infected people who need and receive
critical care, and ξ2 is the additional, incremental death rate when such individuals
do not receive that care. One aim of the decision maker is to minimise these deaths.
It is of course very difficult to determine what value society should place on
averting a premature death generally, or in the case of COVID-19 in particular.
We represent that quantity by the parameter M , the cost per COVID-19 death, and
consider a very wide range of values for that parameter.
The literature has traditionally used values for M ranging at least from 20 times
GDP per capita (Alvarez et al. 2020) up to 150 times GDP per capita (Kniesner et al.
2012). Hammitt (2020) argues that lower values may be appropriate for COVID-19
deaths, so we consider a range from 10 to 150 times GDP per capita.
Economic activity is modelled as being proportional to the number of employed
people raised to a power, as in a classic Cobb-Douglas model, with that exponent set
1 In our numerical simulations we have replaced the max function that is not differentiable with a
smooth function (see Caulkins et al. 2020, Fig. 1).
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to σ = 2/3 (Acemoglu 2009). Since the time horizon is short, capital is presumed
to be fixed and subsumed into the objective function coefficient K for economic
activity. Susceptible, latent, and recovered individuals are eligible to work (symp-
tomatic individuals are assumed to be either too sick to work, or are in quarantine).
During a lockdown, only a proportion γ (t) of those eligible to work are employed.
We therefore assume that γ (t) = 1.0 before the lockdown, γ (t) = 0.25 during the
lockdown, and after lockdown it only partially recovers. The longer the lockdown,
the more jobs that are lost semi-permanently because firms go out of business. That
recovery is modelled as decaying exponentially in the length of the lockdown with
a time constant of 0.001 per day, so that if a lockdown ended after six months, 17%
of jobs suspended during the lockdown would not reappear, at least until a vaccine
became available.
These economic and mortality costs are summed up from time t = 0, when the
virus arrives, until time T = 1.5 years, when a vaccine has been developed and
widely deployed.
The objective function also includes a salvage value that reflects the reduction in
economic activity at time T relative to what it was at time 0 (see Caulkins et al. 2020
for further discussion of the salvage value). The summary of the full model and the
base case parameter values are given in Appendix 1 and Table9.4 Appendix 3.
9.2.2 Results
COVID-19 spread very fast in early 2020, so lockdown initiation was often a rushed
decision made so quickly that there was no time to build models or optimise them.
Hence, we start, in Fig. 9.1, by considering the simpler problem of when to end a
lockdown that has already started, answering that question for a wide range of start
times. In particular, the left hand panel of Fig. 9.1 shows with the solid blue line how
that optimal ending time (measured by the vertical axis, τ2) varies as a function of the
time the lockdown was started (given as the horizontal axis, τ1). The gap between the
blue line and the black line (45-degree line) indicates the duration of the lockdown.
For this model and these parameter values, if the lockdown starts promptly (so
on the left side of that panel) the lockdown should be maintained almost until the
time when the vaccine has been successfully deployed. That is assumed to happen
in 1.5years; since time is measured in days, that corresponds to 547.5 on the vertical
axis. That the blue line starts out at a level of about 500 days indicates maintaining
the lockdown until only a month or two before the vaccine has been successfully
deployed would minimise total costs, including both health and economic costs.
(Ending the lockdown before full deployment does not require an implausible degree
of forecasting ability; predicting how long it will take to invent an effective vaccine
is hard, but deployment takes approximately six months, so recognising when it is
within a couple months of wrapping up is not that hard.)
So the first conclusion is, if a nation starts to lock down early, it should keep that
lockdown in place more or less for the duration of the epidemic.
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Fig. 9.1 Panel a shows the solutions for a fixed initial lockdown time τ1 and optimally chosen time
τ2. In panel b the objective value is shown for the optimally chosen time τ2. For τ1 = 22.6, which is
indicated by the black dashed line, there exists a Skiba solution, i.e. there are two different solution
paths which deliver the same objective value. The red vertical line denotes the optimally chosen τ1.
The parameter values are those of Table9.4 in Appendix 3, with M = 60, 000 and R20 = 0.8
Now suppose the lockdown’s initiation was delayed a bit, meaning we slide a little
to the right along the horizontal axis of Fig. 9.1. Intuitively one might have expected
that getting a late start would imply one should maintain the lockdown longer to
compensate, but the opposite is true in this model. The fact that the blue line slopes
downward implies that the later one starts the lockdown, the sooner it should end.
The second surprising result is that the blue line does not decline smoothly; it
contains a discontinuous jump when the lockdown starts at τ1 = 22.6 days. As one
delays the start of the lockdown from τ1 from 0 up to 22.5days, the ideal ending
time τ2 decreases smoothly from about 500days (roughly a year and four months)
down to a little less than a year. Then suddenly, when the lockdown starts just a little
later, at τ1 = 22.7 days, it becomes optimal to end the lockdown fairly soon, at only
τ1 = 120 days, or after about three months.
What has happened at that point is that the epidemic has had a chance to spread
so widely in those first 22.7days that it is just too hard to rein the epidemic in for it to
be worthwhile. If a prolonged lockdown were going to spare most of the population
from getting infected it would be worth the cost; but if the lockdown hasn’t started
until τ1 = 22.7 days, it is just too late for it to be wise to pursue that strategy. One
should still lockdown, but only relatively briefly. That can “flatten the curve” a bit
and avoid totally swamping the limited capacity of the healthcare system.
In simple words, if the lockdown starts too late, then one should abandon the “long
lockdown” strategy that protects most people from infection, and instead employ a
much more limited “curve flattening” strategy.
The discontinuity in the blue line shows that if the lockdown starts at just exactly
τ1 = 22.6 days, then either the “long lockdown” or the “curve flattening” can be
followed with equal results.
This equivalency is illustrated more directly in the right-hand panel of Fig. 9.1,
which shows the so-called value function (V ) versus the lockdown initiation time τ1.
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The value function indicates the performance achieved when the optimal strategy is
followed. There is a kink in the value function right at τ1 = 22.6 days. To the left of
that kink it is optimal to follow the “long lockdown” strategy, but the plunging value
function shows that the “long lockdown” strategy performs less and less well as τ1
increases. Likewise, to the right of τ1 = 22.6 days it is optimal to follow the “curve
flattening” strategy, but as the lockdown start time decreases, approaching 22.6 from
the right, the “curve flattening” strategy does less and less well. And right at τ1 the
two strategies’ value functions cross.
The third surprising result pertains to where the blue line in the right- hand panel
of Fig. 9.1 peaks. It is not ideal to start the lockdown immediately at τ1 = 0. Instead,
the value function peaks at about τ1 = 8 days (a point in time indicated in the left
hand panel by a vertical red line). The reason is that every day of lockdown is
expensive, because people are out of work, but at the very beginning, when there
are very, very few infected people, there are also very, very few new infections to be
prevented. When the virus is very scarce, targeted approaches, such as testing and
contact tracing, may be preferred to shutting down the entire economy.
Figure9.1 illustrated two different strategies: a short “curve flattening” lockdown
and a long lockdown that starts after a short delay. For other parameter values, two
other strategies can be optimal: never locking down at all or a long lockdown that
begins immediately.
That raises the question of under what conditions it is optimal to pursue each
strategy. Figure9.2 answers that question with respect to two key parameters: (1) The
economic value placed on preventing a COVID-19 death, M , and (2) the epidemic’s
reproduction number during the lockdown, denoted by the parameter R20 . That figure,
called a bifurcation diagram, shows for each combination of those twokey parameters
which strategy is optimal.
The base case values for those parameters were R20 = 0.8, meaning the lockdown
could still drive the reproduction number below the critical threshold of 1.0, and
M = 60, 000, meaning that the cost of a premature death is set at about 150 times
GDP per capita. That point falls within the region labelled IIb, but for other values
of R20 and/or M different strategies may be optimal.
Not surprisingly, asM increases—meaningmoving from left to right in Fig. 9.2—
the optimal strategy changes to make greater and greater use of lockdowns. When M
is very small, it may be optimal not to lockdown at all. When M is sufficiently large,
then a long lockdown is best. For intermediate values of M , the “curve flattening”
strategy may be best.
The verticality of the Skiba curve separating the regions where no lockdown vs.
a short lockdown are optimal indicates that increasing the epidemic’s reproductive
number during the lockdown R20 has little effect on the relative merits of not locking
down versus using a short lockdown. Thatmakes sense precisely because in neither of
those strategies was the lockdown prolonged in any event. However, the Skiba curve
separating regions where a short lockdown (Region I) and a long lockdown (Regions
IIa and IIb) is preferred slopes up and to the right indicating that the larger R20 is, the
larger M must be in order to justify a long lockdown. That also makes sense. If the
new variant’s higher virulence sufficiently undermines the effectiveness of locking
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IIa: long lockdown starting immediately
IIb: long lockdown starting with delay
Fig. 9.2 Bifurcation diagram in the R20 − M space. The blue lines denote Skiba curves, separating
(discontinuously) regions with different optimality regimes. At the red curve the regimes change
continuously. The point ST corresponds to a triple Skiba point, where three optimal solutions exist.
At the red diamond the discontinuous Skiba solution changes into a continuous transition curve
down, then the value per life saved has to be greater to justify the imposition of a
long lockdown.
One of the interesting features of this model is that two Skiba curves intersect,
namely the curve separatingRegion I fromRegions IIa or IIb and the curve separating
Regions IIa and IIb. That intersection, which is denoted by the point ST , is a triple
Skiba point. If the parameters have exactly those values, then any of three distinct
strategies can be optimal. It is akin to Snow Dome Mountain in Canada’s Jasper
National Park, where a drop of water could equally well flow west through the
Columbia River system to the Pacific Ocean, east to Hudson’s Bay and the Atlantic
Ocean, or north via the Athabasca and McKenzie Rivers into the Arctic Ocean.
Except that instead of being indifferent between flowing to different oceans, at this
point a social planner is indifferent between starting a long lockdown immediately,
starting a long lockdown after a short delay, and employing only a short lockdown.
9.3 The Optimal Lockdown Intensity
The previous section updated results from a model based on Caulkins et al. (2020)
that sought to determine the optimal start and length of a lockdownwhen the intensity
of that lockdown was given exogenously. We next present an extension of the model
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as given in Caulkins et al. (2021) that allows the intensity of the lockdown to vary
continuously over time.
As in Caulkins et al. (2020), we define γ (t) to be the share of potential workers
who are employed at time t . However, now we model γ (t) as a state variable that
can be altered continuously via a control u(t):
γ̇ (t) = u(t), γ (0) = 1,
Wesetγ (0) = 1.0because the planninghorizonbeginswhenCOVID-19first arrives,
and so before there is any lockdown. We include a state constraint γ (t) ≤ 1 for
0 ≤ t ≤ T , since employment cannot exceed 100%. This formulation allows for
multiple lockdowns, takes into account that employment takes time to adjust, and
it recognises that changing employment levels induces adjustment costs, which we
allow to be asymmetric, with it being harder to restart the economy than it is to shut
it down.
Since public approval of lockdowns may wane the longer a lockdown lasts, we
introduce a further state variable that models this “lockdown fatigue” z(t):
ż(t) = κ1 (1 − γ (t)) − κ2z(t),
where κ1 governs the rate of accumulation of fatigue and κ2 measures its rate of
decay. Note that if the worst imaginable lockdown (γ (t) = 0) lasted forever then
z(t) would grow to its maximum possible value of zmax = κ1/κ2.
We use an epidemiological model based on an open-population SIR2 model with
a birth rate ν and extra mortality for individuals who are infected (μI ) above and
beyond that for those who are susceptible or recovered (μ). In addition, we allow a
backflow of recovered individuals back into the susceptible state at a rate φ. How
long immunity will last with SARS-CoV-2 virus is not known at the time of this
writing, but immunity to other corona viruses often lasts 3–5years, so we set φ to
0.001 per day in our base case, which corresponds to a mean duration of immunity
of 1000/365 = 2.74 years.
2 Since the qualitative dynamics in Caulkins et al. (2020) did not change if we excluded the latent
state, we opted for a more parsimonious model in our extensions Caulkins et al. (2021) and the
parameters have been adapted accordingly.
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The state dynamics in our extended model can then be written as
Ṡ(t) = νN (t) − β(γ (t), z(t)) S(t)I (t)
N (t)
− μS(t) + φR(t)
İ (t) = β(γ (t), z(t))) S(t)I (t)
N (t)
− (α + μ + μI )I (t)
Ṙ(t) = α I (t) − μR(t) − φR(t)
γ̇ (t) = u(t), γ (0) = 1
ż(t) = κ1(1 − γ (t)) − κ2z(t), z(0) = 0
γ (t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where N (t) = S(t) + I (t) + R(t) is the total population. As before, the factor
β(γ, z) captures the number of interactions and the likelihood that an interaction
produces an infection. It is assumed to depend on both the intensity of the lockdown
γ and the level of lockdown fatigue z in the following way:
β(γ, z) := β1 + β2
(
γ θ + f κ2
κ1
z(1 − γ θ )
)
This expression can be interpreted as follows. In the absence of lockdown fatigue,
we might model β(γ, 0) as some minimum level of infection risk β1 that is produced
just by essential activities plus an increment β2 that is proportional to γ raised to
an exponent θ > 1. Having θ greater than 1 is consistent with locking down first
the parts of the economy that generate the most infections per unit of economic
activity (perhaps concerts and live sporting events) and shutting down last industries
with high economic output per unit of social interaction (perhaps highly automate
manufacturing and mining).
The term (κ2/κ1)z is the lockdown fatigue expressed as a percentage of its max-
imum possible value. So if f = 1 and z reached its maximum value, then all of the
potential benefits of locking down would be negated. Lockdown fatigue will not
actually reach that maximum because the planning horizon is relatively short. Also,
we choose a relatively small value of f = 0.05, so this lockdown fatigue has only
a modest effect. Nonetheless, including this term at least acknowledges this human
dimension of the public’s response to lockdowns.
The objective function includes health costs (due to deaths from COVID- 19),
economic loss (due to locking down), and the adjustment costs of changing the
employment level γ . We assume these adjustment costs to be quadratic in the control
u and allow for them to be asymmetric with different constants for shutting down
businesses cl and reopening them cr , with an extra penalty for reopening after an
extended shut down so that
Vu(u, γ ) :=
{
clu2 u ≤ 0
cr (z + 1)u2 u > 0.
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The resulting optimal control model and the base case parameter values are sum-
marised in Appedix 2 and Table9.4 Appendix 3.
9.3.1 Results
9.3.1.1 The Effect of Increased Infectivity
Our main interest is in how a mutated strain that is more contagious alters what
strategies are optimal. That is perhaps best captured in Fig. 9.3, which has two panels.
The one on the left corresponds to the old reproduction number of R0 = 2.5; the one
on the right corresponds to the new, higher number of R0 = 4. Both are similar to
the right panel of Fig. 9.1 in that they show how the value function depends on the
parameter M describing the cost per premature death.
This value function can be thought of as the “score” that a social planner “earns”
when he or she follows the optimal strategy. Naturally in both panels the value
function slopes down. The greater the penalty the social planner “pays” for each
premature death, the lower the score. On the left side of each panel the value function
slopes down steeply because there isn’tmuch lockingdown so there are a lot of deaths;
thus, a given increment in the cost per death gets “paid” many times. On the right
side of each panel, the optimal strategy involves an extended lockdown, so there are
fewer deaths and the same increment in the cost per death reduces the social planner’s
score by less.
There are, though, two noteworthy differences between the value functions across
the two panels. First, the kink in the curve, indicating the point at which an extended

















Ia: one early light lockdown
Ib: one late strong lockdown
IIa: two light lockdowns
IIb: one early and one late strong lockdown
IIIa: one long lockdown no temporary relaxing
IIIb: one long lockdown with temporary relaxing
(a) 0 = 2.5











∗ IIa IbIa IIb IIIa
(b) 0 = 4
Fig. 9.3 Dependence of the value function on the social cost of a death M for the base case
parameters in Table9.4 Appendix 3 and lockdown fatigue f = 0. There are four main regimes (no
lockdown, I, II, III) which differ by the duration, intensity, and number of lockdowns of the optimal
solutions. For the value of M highlighted by solid vertical black lines two different solution paths
are optimal. The dashed vertical lines denote continuous transitions from one regime to the other
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lockdown becomes preferred, occurs at a larger value of M in the right-hand panel.
That is because when the reproduction number is larger, it takes a more determined
lockdown to pull off the extended lockdown strategy, making it more costly and
less appealing unless the penalty per premature death is larger. The difference is not
enormous though, with valuations equivalent to about (M = 11, 560) 32 times GDP
per capita in the right panel and (M = 10, 140) 28 times GDP per capita in the left
panel.
The second difference is that—at least with all other parameters at their base case
values—increasing R0 increased the number of different types of strategies that can
be optimal. With R0 = 4 there are five distinguishable types of lockdown strategies
that can be optimal, not just two.
Here is how to interpret the labels of the four regions Ia, Ib, IIa, and IIb. The
Roman numeral I or II refers to whether there are one or two lockdowns. The ‘b’
versus ‘a’ roughly indicates whether there is a substantial lockdown later in the
planning horizon to prevent a rebound epidemic. (A rebound may be possible after
an appreciable number of previously infected individuals have lost their immunity
and returned to the susceptible state S via the backflow.)
Figure9.4 shows example control trajectories for all five regions. The vertical
axis is γ , the proportion of workers who are allowed to work, so any dip below 1.0
indicates a lockdown. If the social planner places a very low value on preventing
COVID-19 deaths (e.g., M = 1500 in panel a), then there is only a small, short early
lockdown which does little except to take a bit of the edge off the initial spike in
infections. Such a small effort does not prevent many people from getting infected,
but it shifts a few infections to later, when hospitals are less overwhelmed. When
M is a little larger (specifically M = 3200 in panel c), then there is also a similarly
small lockdown later, to take a bit of the edge off of the rebound epidemic. But in
neither of those cases is there much locking down or much reduction in infections.
When M is still larger (M = 5000 in panel b) the later lockdown gets consider-
ably larger—large enough to essentially prevent the rebound epidemic. Curiously,
at this point the initial lockdown disappears, but it wasn’t very big to begin with,
so this qualitative change is not actually a very big difference substantively. When
M increases further (M = 11, 000) the initial lockdown reappears, albeit as a very
small blip.
Then rather abruptly when M crosses the Skiba curve separating type I and II
strategies from type III strategies it becomes optimal to use a very large and sustained
lockdown to reduce infections and deaths dramatically. Panel e shows the particular
optimal lockdown trajectory when M = 13, 000, which is equivalent to valuing a
premature death at 35 times GDP per capita. That sustained lockdown averts most of
the infections and deaths, but at the considerable cost of almost 50% unemployment
for about a year and a half.
Thus, when the lockdown intensity is allowed to vary continuously, many nuances
emerge, but the overall character still boils down to an almost binary choice. If M
is high enough, then use a sustained and forceful lockdown to largely preempt the
epidemic despite massive levels of economic dislocation. Otherwise, lockdowns are
too blunt and expensive to employ as the primary response to the epidemic. Thus,
the model prescribes an almost all-or-nothing approach to economic lockdowns.
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(a) Regime Ia ( = 1500)










(b) Regime Ib ( = 5000)










(c) Regime IIa ( = 3200)










(d) Regime IIb ( = 11000)










(e) Regime IIIa ( = 13000)
Fig. 9.4 Showing the time evolution of the optimal lockdown for the different regimes in Fig. 9.3b
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For certain combinations of parameter values (e.g., Fig. 9.4 panels b and d corre-
sponding to M = 5, 000 and M = 11, 000) it can be optimal to act fairly decisively
against the rebound epidemic even if all one does in response to the first epidemic is a
bit of curve flattening. It may seem odd to lock down more aggressively in response
to the second, smaller epidemic, but the reason is eminently practical. When the
reproduction number is high enough, it is very hard to prevent the epidemic from
exploding if everyone is susceptible. But there is already an appreciable degree of
herd immunity when the second, rebound epidemic threatens, so a less severe lock-
down can be sufficient to preempt it.
9.3.1.2 Interpreting the Types of Lockdown Strategies that Can be
Optimal
Table9.1 summarises the nature and performance of each of the strategies in the right-
hand panel of Fig. 9.3. Its columns merit some discussion. The lockdowns’ start and
end times are self-explanatory except to note that with strategies IIa and IIb, there are
two separate lockdowns, so there are two separate start and end times. The intensity
of the lockdown measures the amount of unemployment that the lockdown creates
on a scale where 365 corresponds to no one in the population working for an entire
year.
Table9.1 shows that even when lockdown intensity and duration are allowed to
vary continuously, there are basically only three sizes that emerge as optimal: very
small (less than 1.04), modest (around 30–35, or the equivalent of the economy
giving up one month of economic output), and large (around 360, or the equivalent
of the economy giving up a full year of economic output).
The levels of deaths also fall into basically three levels. High (around 2.9% of the
population) goes with small lockdowns. Medium-high deaths (around 2.4%) goes
with modest lockdowns. Small deaths (around 0.2%) goes with large lockdowns.
It would be nice to have a small number of deaths despite only imposing a small
lockdown, but that just isn’t possible.
In sum, there are basically three strategies: (1) Do very little locking down and
suffer deaths both from the initial epidemic and also the rebound epidemic as people
lose immunity, (2) Only do a bit of curve flattening during the first epidemic but use
a modest sized lockdown later on to prevent the rebound epidemic and so have a
medium-high number of deaths, or (3) Lockdown forcefully more or less throughout
the entire planning horizon in order to avert most of the deaths altogether.
Figure9.2 provides the corresponding information when R0 = 2.5. It shows that
when the virus is less contagious the large lockdown does not need to be quite as
large (size of 257 or about 8.5months of lost output, not a full year) in order to
hold the number of deaths down to low levels. Perhaps surprisingly, the minimalist
strategies (Ia) are less minimalist when R0 = 2.5; when R0 = 4.0 the epidemic is
just so powerful that it is not even worth doing as much curve flattening as it is when
R0 = 2.5.
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Table 9.1 R0 = 4: Data characterising the optimal solutions for the different regimes of Fig. 9.4.
The size of the lockdown is defined as
∫ τe
τs
(1 − γ (t))dt, where τs is the starting and τe the exit time
of the lockdown





24.8 77.4 52.6 0.5 2.9 1500
Lockdown:
Ib
412.8 730.0 317.2 32.8 2.4 5000
Lockdown:
IIa
1 21.4 81.3 59.9 0.8 – –
2 659.5 713.8 54.2 0.1 – –
Total – – 114.1 0.9 2.9 3200
Lockdown:
IIb
1 3.2 30.9 27.7 0.0 – –
2 388.1 730.0 341.9 35.8 – –
Total − − 369.6 35.8 2.3 11,000
Lockdown:
IIIa
0.0 730.0 730.0 360.8 0.2 13,000
Table 9.2 R0 = 2.5. The optimal solutions for R0 = 2.5 evaluated at the same M values as for
R0 = 4





– – – 0 2.1 1500
Lockdown:
Ib
35.2 145.8 110.6 4.8 2.0 5000
Lockdown:
IIa
44.3 122.2 77.9 1.3 2.1 3200
Lockdown:
IIb
0.0 730.0 730.0 257.6 0.2 11,000
Lockdown:
IIIa
0.0 730.0 730.0 258.8 0.2 13,000
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9.3.1.3 The Effects of Lockdown Fatigue
One feature of the current model is its recognition of lockdown fatigue. Recall that
fatiguemeans that the infection-preventing benefits of an economic lockdownmay be
eroded over time by the public becoming less compliant, e.g., because the economic
suffering produces pushback. The results above used parameter values that meant the
power of that fatigue was fairly modest. In this subsection we explore how greater
tendencies to fatigue can influence what strategy is optimal.
The tool again is a bifurcation diagram with the horizontal axis denoting M , the
value the social planner places on preventing a premature death. (See Fig. 9.5.) Now,
though, the vertical axis measures the strength of the fatigue effect, running from
0 (no effect) up to 1.0. The units of this fatigue effect are difficult to interpret, but
roughly speaking, over the time horizons contemplated here, if f = 1.0 then when
employing the sustained lockdown strategies, the lockdowns lose about half of their
effectiveness by the time they are relaxed.
Figure9.5 shows the results. When that fatigue parameter is small (lower parts of
Fig. 9.5), the march across the various strategies with increasing M is the same as
that depicted in Fig. 9.3. With large values (top of Fig. 9.5), there are two differences.
First, Region Ib disappears but Region IIb remains, meaning if it is ever optimal to
use a moderately strong lockdown to forestall a rebound epidemic, then one also
does at least something in response to the first epidemic. Second, Region IIIa gives
way to Region IIIb in which some degree of lockdown is maintained for an extended
time, but it is relaxed somewhat between the first and rebound epidemics in order to
let levels of fatigue dissipate somewhat.
The still more important lesson though pertains to the curve separating regions
where some major lockdown is optimal (whether that is of type IIIa or IIIb) and
regions where only small or moderate sized lockdowns are optimal (Regions Ia, Ib,
IIa, or IIb). That boundary slopes upward and to the right, meaning that the greater
the tendency of the public to fatigue, the higher the cost per premature death (M)
has to be in order for a very strong and sustained lockdown to be optimal. That
makes sense. If fatigue will undermine part of the effectiveness of a large lockdown,
then the valuation of the lockdown’s benefits has to be greater in order to justify its
considerable costs.
This suggests that those advocating for very long lockdowns might want to think
about whether there are ways of making that lockdown more palatable in order to
minimise fatigue. For example, some Canadian provinces tempered their policies
limiting social interaction to people within a household bubble so that people living
alone were permitted to meet with up to two other people, to avoid the mental health
harms of total isolation.
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Fig. 9.5 This figure shows the different regions in the M − f space. The green lines denote
continuous transitions from region region I to II (R0 = 4). The blue curve is a Skiba curve, where
the transition from region II to III is discontinuous and at the Skiba curve two optimal solutions exist.
The Skiba curve switch to a continuous transition curve (red) at the red diamond. In Regime IIIb
the lockdown is relaxed in between and then tightened again, whereas in Regime IIIa the lockdown
is steadily increased and then steadily relaxed
9.3.1.4 Illustrating Skiba Trajectories
One key finding here is that for certain sets of parameter values, two—or sometimes
even three—very different strategies can produce exactly the same net value for the
social planner. We close by illustrating this phenomenon in greater detail.
Returning to Fig. 9.3b, with the higher level of infectivity believed to pertain
for the UK variant of the virus, as the valuation placed on preventing a premature
death (M) increases, one crosses two Skiba thresholds, one at M = 3395 separating
Regions IIa and Ib and another at M = 11, 560 separating Regions IIb and IIIa.
These thresholds are denoted in Fig. 9.3b by solid vertical lines. They can also be
seen in Fig. 9.5 by moving left to right at the bottom level ( f = 0).
Figure9.6 shows the two alternate strategies, in terms of γ , the proportion of
employees who are allowed to work. The left panel shows the two equally good
strategies when M = 3395; the right-hand panel shows the two strategies that are
equally good when M = 11, 560.We have already discussed their nature. On the left
side one is choosing between two very small lockdowns and one moderately large
lockdown later. On the right side one is choosing between a pair of lockdowns (very
small early and moderately large later) and one very deep and sustained lockdown.
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Table 9.3 Data on costs for Skiba point at M = 11, 560
Uncontrolled Flattening long and sustained
lockdown
Health costs 335.67 271.42 25.33
Economy 18.27 36.77 270.13
Adjustment costs 0 0.91 13.64
Total costs 353.94 309.10 309.10
Deaths (%) 2.9 2.3 0.2
The observation to stress for present purposes is just how different the trajectories
are in each pairing. When one crosses a Skiba threshold, what is optimal can change
quite radically. Likewise, when one is standing exactly at that Skiba threshold, one
has two equally good options, but those options are radically different.
That means that when two people advocate very different lockdown strategies
in response to COVID-19, one cannot presume that they have very different under-
standings of the science or very different value systems. They might actually share
very similar or indeed even identical worldviews, but still favour radically different
policies.
Table9.3 illustrates how this can be so. Its first column summarises the outcomes
(costs) when there is no control. Health costs are enormous because more or less
everyone gets infected and 2.9% of the population dies; the numbers are on a scale
such that 365 is one year’s GDP, so the health cost of 335.7 is almost as bad as losing
an entire year’s economic output. There are also some economic losses from losing
the productivity of those who die prematurely, producing a total cost of 353.9.
The second column shows that modest deployment of lockdowns only reduces
health costs by 20%, to 271.4, whereas a severe and sustained lockdown reduces
them by 92.5%, to 25.3. However, the severe and sustained lockdown multiplies
costs of lost labor fifteenfold, to 270.1, and creates an additional cost equivalent to
13.6 days of output from forcing businesses to adjust to changing lockdown policies.
Summing across all three types of costs produces the same total of 309.1 for both
types of lockdown strategies.
Thus the two lockdown strategies produce the same aggregate performance
(309.1), but with very different compositions. The moderate lockdown strategy cre-
ates smaller economic costs but only reduces health costs by 20%. The severe and
sustained lockdown eliminates most of the healthcare costs but creates very large
economic dislocation.
What is quite sobering is that either optimal policy only reduces total social cost
by 13%, from 353.9 to 309.14. The COVID-19 pandemic is truly horrible; at least
within this model, even responding to it optimally alleviates only a modest share
of the suffering. Lockdowns can convert health harms to economic harms, but they
cannot do much to reduce the total amount of harm.
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Fig. 9.6 Optimal time paths for the Skiba solutions for M = 3395, 11560 in Fig. 9.3b
9.4 Discussion
This paper investigated implications of theSARS-CoV-2virus beingmore contagious
than has previously been understood, e.g., because of a mutation or variant strain. In
particular, it investigates implications for economic lockdown strategies within an
optimal control model that balances health and economic considerations. A number
of results were confirmed that had been obtained earlier with parameters reflecting
the earlier understanding of the epidemic’s reproduction number. In particular, we
continue to find that:
• Very different lockdown policies can be optimal—ranging from very little to long
and sustained lockdowns—depending on the value of parameters that are difficult
to pin down, notably including the valuation placed on averting a premature death.
• For certain parameter constellations, the nature of the optimal policy can change
radically even with quite small changes in these parameters.
• There are even situations inwhich two very different policies can both yield exactly
the same aggregate performance, with one strategy’s better performance at reduc-
ing deaths being exactly offset by its worse performance in other respects.
• As we have discussed previously in Caulkins et al. (2020), these results suggest
a degree of humility is in order when advocating for one policy over another.
Another person who favours a very different policy might actually share a very
similar scientific understanding of the disease dynamics and even hold similar
values, and yet still reasonably reach quite different conclusions.
There are, though, differences here. One is that a greater variety of strategies emerged
as candidates. Some concerned how to address a potential rebound epidemic among
people who were previously infected but then flowed back from the recovered to
the susceptible state as their immunity wore off. For some parameter values, if the
virus is sufficiently contagious and the time until a vaccine arrives long enough, it
may be prohibitively difficult to substantially avoid the initial wave of infection, but
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nonetheless be desirable to use a moderately aggressive lockdown to avert a rebound
epidemic, for two reasons. First, it is easier to deal with the rebound epidemic because
there will still be some degree of herd immunity at that time, in contrast to the
situation when the virus first arrives. Second, the time until a vaccine’s arrival is
obviously shorter when addressing a rebound as opposed to the initial epidemic, so
any lockdowns do not need to be sustained as long.
Indeed, whereas in the past the multiplicity of strategies basically fell into two
camps, either a fairly modest lockdown that served only to flatten the curve and a
much more intensive and sustained lockdown that largely protected the population
from infection, now there is a third category of strategies. It might be thought of as
flattening the first wave and eliminating the second.
Wealso investigatedmore thoroughly thanbefore the potential effects of lockdown
fatigue. The primary results are perhaps as expected. The greater the tendency for
fatigue to undermine the effectiveness of a lockdown, the higher one must value the
benefits created by a lockdown in order for a large and sustained lockdown to be
optimal. That suggests that those wishing to impose long and deep lockdowns might
want to think about ways of reducing resistance to those measures.
In sum, when lockdown intensity is allowed to vary continuously, many nuances
emerge, but the overall character still boils down to an almost binary choice, one
made perhaps even more stark if the virus becomes more contagious. If the value
placed on preventing a premature death is high enough, then a social planner should
use a sustained and forceful lockdown to preempt the epidemic despite incurring
massive economic dislocation. Otherwise, lockdowns are too blunt and expensive
to employ as the primary response to the epidemic. Thus, the model prescribes an
almost all-or-nothing approach to economic lockdowns.
That finding does not mean that modulated approaches to what might be termed
social lockdowns do not have a role. It may be entirely possible for a government
to ramp up or down when and where it requires masks and social distancing outside
the workplace, or to do the same with travel restrictions and quarantines. Our model
is looking only at economic lockdowns.
Here is one way to think about this conclusion. We credited policy makers with
a degree of common sense that could have made intermediate levels of economic
lockdowns appealing. In particular, we assumed that the benefits in terms of reduced
infection were a concave function of the amount of the economy that is shut down.
In plain language, we presumed policy makers would shut down first the economic
activities that had the greatest ratio of infection risk to economic value (e.g., in-
person concerts and other crowd gatherings) and shut down last those that produce
a lot of economic value per unit of infection risk (e.g., mining and highly automated
manufacturing). If the virus’ behaviour were linear, that might be expected to favour
lockdowns of intermediate intensity. However, the contagious spread of a virus is
highly nonlinear, involving very powerful positive feedback loops that produce expo-
nential growth. To speak informally, if the virus gets its nose into the tent and locking
down is the only policy response, then the virus will rip through the population if the
lockdown is anything other than very strong.
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The good news is that policy makers do have other tools besides lockdowns.
For example, rapid, intense testing and contact tracing might be able to hold down
infections when there are relatively few people getting infected. But if the virus
spreads beyond the ability of such targeted measures, and the only remaining tool is
broad-based economic lockdowns, the analysis here suggests being decisive;waffling
efforts may produce the worst of both worlds, with substantial economic losses and
still high rates of infection.
We close with a caveat. Despite its apparent complexity, this model explored
here is of course vastly simplified compared to the real world, and there is much
that remains unknown and uncertain about optimal economic response to pandemic
threats. We hope we have usefully provoked thinking and advanced understanding,
but hope even more fervently that society will invest heavily in much more such
analysis, so that we can all be better prepared the next time the world confronts a
novel pandemic.
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Appendix 1
The decision variables are τ1 and τ2, the times when the lockdown begins and ends,
and the full model can be written as:




Vl(W (t), τ1, τ2) − Vh(I (t))
)
dt
− (T + )KW (0)σ γ (0, τ1, τ2)σ
+ KW (T )σ γ (T, τ1, τ2)σ
V ∗(X0) := max
τ1,τ2




SLIR1(X (t), τ1, τ2) 0 ≤ t < τ1
SLIR2(X (t), τ1, τ2), τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2
SLIR3(X (t), τ1, τ2) τ2 < t ≤ T
X (0) = X0 ≥ 0
γ (t, τ1, τ2) :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γ1 0 ≤ t < τ1
γ2 τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2
γ3(τ1, τ2) := γ2 + (γ1 − γ2)eκ2(τ1−τ2) τ2 < t ≤ T
Reff(t, τ1, τ2) :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R10 0 ≤ t < τ1
R20 τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2
R30(τ1, τ2) := R̄30 + (R10 − R̄30)eκ1(τ1−τ2) τ2 < t ≤ T
with R20 ≤ R̄30 ≤ R10 .
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We specify the health care term and the economic (labor) term in the objective as
Vh(I ) := M (ξ1 pI + ξ2 max({0, pI − Hmax}, ζ ))
Vl(W, τ1, τ2) := Kγ (t, τ1, τ2)σW (t)σ .
The derivation of the necessary optimality conditions can be found in the Appendix 1
in Caulkins et al. (2020). The Matlab toolbox OCMat is used for the numerical
calculations (see http://orcos.tuwien.ac.at/research/ocmat_software).
Appendix 2




Vl(W (t), γ (t)) − Vh(I (t)) − Vu(u(t), z(t))
)
dt
− (T + )KW (0)σ γ (0)σ
+ KW (T )σ γ (T )σ
V ∗(X0) := max
u(·)
V (X0, u(·))
X (t) := (S(t), I (t), R(t), γ (t), z(t)), W (t) := S(t) + R(t)
N (t) := S(t) + I (t) + R(t).
s.t. Ṡ(t) = νN (t) − β(γ (t), z(t)) S(t)I (t)
N (t)
− μS(t) + φR(t)
İ (t) = β(γ (t), z(t)) S(t)I (t)
N (t)
− (α + μ + μI )I (t)
Ṙ(t) = α I (t) − μR(t) − φR(t)
γ̇ (t) = u(t), γ (0) = 1
ż(t) = κ1(1 − γ (t)) − κ2z(t), z(0) = 0
γ (t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
β(γ, z) := β1 + β2
(
γ θ + f κ2
κ1
z(1 − γ θ )
)
Vl(W, γ ) := Kγ σW σ
Vh(I ) := M (ξ1 pI + ξ2 maxs({0, pI − Hmax}, ζ ))
Vu(u, z) :=
{
clu2 u ≤ 0
cr (z + 1)u2 u > 0
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Appendix 3
Table 9.4 Base case parameter values and initial state variable values. The ∗ denotes a free param-
eter and is specified in the figures
Variable Model Model Description
Sect. 9.2 Sect. 9.3
α 1/9 1/15 Reciprocal of average duration of the infection
R1,2,30 4, ∗, 3.2 – Level of infection risk
γ
1,2,3
0 1, 0.25, 0.75 – Level of lockdown intensity
β1 – 0 Minimum level of infection risk
β2 – 0.2 Increment in the level of infection risk
Hmax 1.76 × 10−4 2 × 10−4 Capacity of intensive care units
p 2.311 × 10−2 2.25 × 10−2 Probability that infected person needs critical care
M ∗ ∗ Social cost of a premature death due to COVID-19
K 1 1 Coefficient on economic activity
 365 365 Reflects time required to return to full employment
f 0.75 – Likelihood of spreading the virus when in the L state
f – ∗ Impact of lockdown fatigue on infection risk
κ1 2 × 10−3 – Rate of decay for lockdown intensity
κ1 – 0.15 Rate of accumulation of fatigue
κ2 10
−3 – Rate of decay for reproduction number
κ2 – 0.2 Rate of exponential decay of fatigue
ω 0.6 – Proportion of infections that become symptomatic
ϕ 1/7.2 – Reciprocal of average duration of the latency
σ 2/3 2/3 Labor elasticity in Cobb-Douglas production function
ν 0.01/365 0 Birth rate
μ 0.01/365 0 Death rate (not caused by COVID-19)
μI 13/10800 0 COVID-19 death rate
ζ 5000 5000 Parameter in the approximation of the max-function
ξ1 0.05 0.03 Death rate of infected individual in critical care
ξ2 0.55/9 0.55/15 Incremental death rate if IC capacity is exceeded
φ – 0.001 Rate by which recovered get susceptible again
cl – 1000 Parameter in business shutting down costs
cr – 5000 Parameter in business reopening costs
θ 2 2 Exponent in the proportionality function β(t)
S(0) 0.999 0.999 Initial susceptible population
L(0) 0.001 – Initial latent population
I (0) 0 0.001 Initial infected population
R(0) 0 0 Initial recovered population
γ (0) – 1 Initial employment level
z(0) – 0 Initial lockdown fatigue
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